Introduction
The literature on political connections among firms is abundant. However, the existing evidence based on experiences from non-European emerging economies or developed countries is not directly applicable to post-transitional Central Europe as a result of the historical, cultural, and institutional specificity of these countries. Our study therefore fills a gap in the literature by characterizing politically connected firms and their access to bank financing in the context of a post-communist economy. The issue of politically connected firms' potentially privileged access to bank loans-and, consequently, the uneven playing field among firms-has important policy implications, as more than one-third of the listed companies in Poland were politically connected during the 2001−2011 period.
The existing literature offers several explanations for the widespread presence of politically connected firms in both developing and mature economies. These explanations can be broadly divided into three categories. The first group stems from the seminal resource dependence theory by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) . In this approach, political connections facilitate access to scarce and valuable resources, such as bank loans or government contracts. Political connections also compensate for the institutional vacuum that frequently characterises emerging countries (Allen et al., 2006) , help firms cope with economic uncertainty or moral hazard problems (Li and Zhang, 2007) , and constitute a form of insurance against negative external shocks Blau et al., 2011) . The second group of explanations underlines the role of politicians' or a government's goals.
Accordingly, from this perspective, political connections are considered a method of using firms' resources to win or maintain political support, an alternative to means of controlling strategically important enterprises through capital engagement (Boubakri et al., 2008; Wu and Cheng, 2011; Wu et al., 2012) or a mechanism enabling the stabilization of undemocratic regimes (Choi and Thum, 2009) . The third and final group of reasons for creating political connections and investing in their durability is related to managers' interests.
Firms' relationships with politicians constitute an important part of the social capital brought in by directors, as these relationships are difficult to replicate and, consequently, may improve firms' competitive positions (Peng and Luo, 2000; Li and Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008) .
The study directly tests the validity of the first group of explanations in the context of a post-transitional European economy by investigating whether politically connected firms in Poland play an important role in the economy and have greater access to Iftekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Oskar Kowalewski and Łukasz Kozłowski Politically connected firms in Poland and their access to bank financing 6 bank financing. We believe that the Polish economy constitutes an appropriate context for such an investigation. The reasons are twofold. First, all European post-transitional countries, owing to their historical legacies, are known for frequent intersections of political and business interests (Kowalewski and Rybinski, 2011) . Second, the existing literature on political connections heavily relies on datasets from China and other Asian countries or Latin
American economies, and therefore, previous findings-however relevant-are not necessarily applicable to Central European countries.
Using a new and comprehensive dataset, we establish that the relationship be- of listed companies in Poland had personal political connections in at least one financial year, and that politically connected entities are larger, located closer to Warsaw, and more frequently in regulated and strategically important industries than their competitors. Even though our evidence is based on Polish data, we believe that our results have a wider appeal: our results are relevant to other Central European post-transitional countries in particular and supplement the literature on political connections in general.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, this study fills an important gap in the literature concerning the functioning of politically connected firms.
As mentioned above, to the best of our knowledge, the frequency of political connections and their impact on access to bank financing has not been thoroughly studied in the litera-
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BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/ 2014 7 ture in the specific context of Central European post-transitional countries. Second, the study verifies and develops some previous claims about the number and share of politically connected firms in Poland from cross-country studies (Faccio, 2004 (Faccio, , 2006 , which are by their nature necessarily less detailed. Third, our empirical analysis is based on a unique, hand-collected dataset concerning political connections. This dataset is dynamic and allows us to characterize connections along several dimensions, such as the age of political connections, level of political connections (national or local), political experience of firms' employees and positions held by connected employees (on supervisory boards or management teams), and to assess the changes in importance of political connections brought about by the macroeconomic situation and institutional reforms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 concentrates on the frequency and characteristics of political connections. It reviews the relevant literature, presents our data, and describes our empirical findings for the Polish economy. Section 3 focuses on the impact of political connections on long-term debt availability. Once more, we begin with a literature review to develop our own hypotheses. Then, we present the empirical design and results. Section 4 discusses the main conclusions.
2
The frequency of political connections
Literature review
We identified in the literature three works describing at length the frequency of political connections among firms. Faccio (2004 Faccio ( , 2006 and Boubakri et al. (2008) analyzed the frequency of political connections in the international context, while Kang and Zhang (2012) focused on the US market only. However, many other researchers have provided brief statements concerning the share of politically connected enterprises in their samples. It is worth stressing that most previous studies have examined the factors responsible for the creation of political connections, rather than the sheer existence of political connections. In addition to the aforementioned authors, the factors affecting the probability of being a politically connected firm were established by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for US firms, by Xin and Pearce (1996) and Li et al. (2006) for Chinese firms, and by Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) Faccio (2004 Faccio ( , 2006 , have been absent in previously published studies. Houston et al. (2012) , and Kang and Zhang (2012) for the United States; Malesky and Taussig (2009) for Vietnam; Faccio (2006) and Boubakri et al. (2008) for the international context. Faccio (2004 Faccio ( , 2006 identified 541 politically connected enterprises in 35 countries, which accounted for 2.68% of the analyzed firms. In 12 of 47 countries, Faccio (2004 Faccio ( , 2006 did not find any personal connections between politics and business. Among these countries were two from Central Europe: the Czech Republic and Poland. Boubakri et al. (2008) established that 35.5% of privatized firms in their sample-which included data from 41 countries-were politically connected. In the case of the US market, Kang and Zhang (2012) discovered that during the 1990−2007 period, 43.3% of the observations regarding listed companies originated from entities that hired at least one politically connected director. Moreover, Kang and Zhang (2012) showed that the share of politically connected firms steadily increased during the sample period. Moreover, many other researchers have incidentally provided data necessary to calculate the frequency of politically connected firms.
The distribution of the relevant assessments is shown in Figure 1 . In 14 of 21 studies, the share of politically connected firms is between 20% and 50%. However, this result should The descriptive analysis of the frequency of political connections is usually supplemented in the literature with econometric models that are designed to identify the determinants of the creation of political ties. Faccio (2004; established that political connections are more common in countries that are characterized by intense corruption and capital flow restrictions, while the frequency of political connections is lower in countries with strict regulations regarding conflicts of interests. Also in the international context, Boubakri et al. (2008) found that the creation of political ties is more likely when the judiciary system is less independent, the political base of the government is less stable, firms have a large scale of operations, their headquarters are located in the main cities of a country, and companies are in regulated industries. In the case of developed markets, the determinants of political connections have only been studied for US firms. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) showed that political ties are more frequent among large companies, companies that are dependent on government contracts and export productions, and entities that are heavily involved in lobbying activities. 11 years later, Kang and Zhang, reached almost the same conclusions. However, they added the observation that political ties are more ubiquitous in regulated industries. The similarity in the findings between these studies shows that the determinants of political connections are quite stable over time, at least for the American market. Regarding emerging markets, there is some empirical evidence based on Chinese and Thai enterprises. Xin and Pearce (1996) observed that in China managers of private companies were more frequently politically connected and perceived political ties to be more important to the success of a firm than their peers, and so concluded that political connections help firms deal with institutional weaknesses. Li et al. (2006) found that political connections were more widespread in Chinese provinces with weaker legal and economic infrastructures. Using Thai data, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) discovered that business tycoons were more likely to participate in general elections when their firms were more dependent on government concessions.
The literature on the frequency of political ties shows thus that connected firms play an important role in both developed and emerging economies. The share of politically connected firms is usually between 20% and 50% of studied companies. Moreover, a low transparency of public life, presence of underdeveloped institutions and stringent regula- 
2.2
The data on political connections in Poland
Unlike in some developed countries, no organisation in Poland provides information on firms' political ties. Therefore, all data presented in this paper were hand collected from different sources. We assume that a company is politically connected when it employs top managers or supervisory board members with experience in politics. 1 A similar approach was previously applied, for example, by Faccio (2006) , Boubakri et al. (2008) , Niessen and Ruenzi (2009), Hung et al. (2012) , and Liu at al. (2012) . In contrast to Faccio (2006) , however, we concentrate only on objectively observed political ties. We exclude the connections created through acquaintances, friendships, and family bonds. To determine the number of political connections among listed firms in Poland, we gathered information on politicians since the fall of communism, as well as on supervisory board members and top managers. The names of politicians were retrieved from documents of the Polish Election Commission, publications of chambers of both the national parliament and local governments, reports prepared by ministries, the National Bank of Poland, and several institutions regulating financial organisations. In addition, we used numerous documents from Internet sources. In sum, the database on politicians in Poland comprises more than 7,500 names, 
2.3
The characteristics of politically connected firms in Poland We compare the size and location of politically connected firms and their untied competitors in Table 2 . The necessary financial data were retrieved from the NOTORIA service.
When we consider sales revenue as a size measure, the statistical test unequivocally shows that politically connected companies are larger than others firms. If we use the value of total assets, the size advantage of the politically connected entities over their peers is visible only in the case of the medians. We obtained the most inconclusive results with regard to market capitalization. While non-financial politically connected firms have significantly greater market values of equity, the results for the entire sample differ for the means and medians. Moreover, the headquarters of politically connected firms are located statistically significantly closer to the centre of power in Poland, Warsaw, the capital. Table 3 .
All values of the regressors, owing to the construction of the dependent variable, were calculated as means for the sample period. The outcomes of the probit model estimation are presented in Table 4 . Panel A provides the results for the entire sample, while Panel B provides the results for non-financial companies only. The characteristics of politically connected firms revealed by the probit regressions are not surprising. In fact, they are mostly consistent with the findings in the literature for other economies. The probability of being a politically connected company is higher for entities with large assets (LnAsimp) or market capitalization (LnMVsimp). The existence of politically connected supervisory boards or management teams is also accompanied by relatively low profitability (ROAsimp) and proximity of capital (WAW). The remaining variables from the first group are either insignificant or their impact is unstable.
With respect to the second group of explanatory variables, political connections are more likely to appear in banking institutions (BANKS), other financial institutions (OT_FIN), and strategically important industries (STRATEG).
Figure 2 Number of firm-year observations for entities classified as politically connected
In comparison to the US economy (Kang and Zhang, 2012) , the political connections in our study are less stable, as the number of firms connected in at least one year is higher than the number of politically connected companies in each year. As Figure 2 shows, the number of firms employing persons with political experience increases from 18 in 2001 to above 50 in the second half of the sample period. However, the number of observations for politically connected entities is still sufficient for a statistical interference because it is equal to 479 for the entire sample and 372 for non-financial companies. The relationship between political connections and the availability of bank financing has been analyzed in the literature almost exclusively with data from emerging economies. The only exceptions are cross-country studies (Faccio, 2006 (Faccio, , 2010 Boubakri et al., 2012) and the study by Houston et al. (2012) . The majority of the relevant works have relied on financial statements as a primary source of information. However, several authors have used survey data (Cull and Xu, 2005; Li et al., 2008; Malesky and Taussig, 2009; Zhou, 2009; Chow et al., 2012) . In only two studies were the statistical inferences based on information concerning individual loans instead of firm-level information (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Lazzarini et al., 2012) . The dependent variables in the relevant articles were usually computed using financial statements and described the financial leverage, share of long-term liabilities or liabilities to banks in total liabilities of firms. Less frequently, the dependent variables were the size of banks or were binary, describing whether a firm contracted bank debt. Independently of the way in which access to bank financing was approximated, the majority of existing studies have concluded that politically connected firms are privileged in this respect in emerging economies (Faccio, 2006 , 2010 , and Boubakri et al., 2012 , for the international context; Cull and Xu, 2005 , Zhou, 2009 , Li et al., 2008 , and Liu et al., 2012 Charumilind et al., 2006, for Thailand; Johnson and Mitton, 2003 , Fraser et al., 2006 , Bliss and Gul, 2012 Melesky and Taussig, 2009, for Vietnam; Khwaja and Mian, 2005, for Pakistan; Claessens et al., 2008, and Lazzarini et al., 2012, for Brazil) . The literature has revealed that maintaining political connections on several levels simultaneously is especially valuable with respect to preferential access to debt financing (Liu et al., 2012; Malesky and Taussig, 2009) , as is maintaining links to influential politicians or winning parties (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Lazzarini et al., 2012) . Politically connected firms are also less financially constrained in their investment programs (Xu et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2012) .
The existing evidence on the relationship between political connections and bank financing should be interpreted cautiously, however, as in some studies, owing to the static nature of the datasets concerning political connections, the observed patterns may result from reverse causality. Theoretically, it is possible that highly leveraged firms and firms that are closely collaborating with banks create and maintain political connections to re- duce the probability of bankruptcy or increase the probability of obtaining public help . While the alternative explanation for the findings reported in the literature cannot be ruled out entirely, there is some evidence that changes in access to financing occur after the creation of political connections Boubakri et al., 2012) . The dynamic nature of the dataset on political ties that is used in this article also helps us to determine whether political connections facilitate bank financing or whether they are created because of the high level of bank debt.
Hypotheses and empirical design
In this section, we test four hypotheses. Because politically connected firms are privileged in the credit market in the majority of emerging economies, we expect the same privilege to apply to Central European countries. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1. Politically connected Polish firms have better access to bank loans than their competitors.
As we indicated above, strong political connections are especially valuable with respect to bank financing. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2. The benefits concerning access to bank loans increase with the strength of political connections.
To ensure that we correctly capture the strength of political connections, we use several methods based on different characteristics of political ties.
The sample period encompasses the years directly preceding Poland's EU accession and the early years of Poland's EU membership. Consequently, during this period, the institutional infrastructure of the economy was quickly gaining maturity and converging toward the standards set by the old EU member states. This situation could weaken the influence of political factors in comparison with other developing countries (Kowalewski and Rybinski, 2011) . However, only three years after Poland joined the EU, the economy was hit by the global financial crisis. From 2007 onward, access to long-term debt financing became more valuable for firms than in the previous period. Consequently, the important of political connections may be greater in the second half of the sample period. These arguments lead us to two mutually exclusive hypotheses: When we analyze the determinants of the LT_LIAB ratio, we restrict the original sample that is used in Section 2 to only non-financial firms because the liability structures of financial and non-financial companies are incomparable. Technically, we exclude from the sample companies classified as banks, insurers, investment firms, and other financial entities. The final sample that is used in this Section includes 2,428 observations for 316 listed firms for the period 2001 to 2011. We base our statistical inferences about the relationship between political connections and bank financing on both static and dynamic panel models to test the stability of the results. Because some variables of interest are time invariant, we opted for the random effects estimator. The dynamic models are estimated using the GMM-SYS procedure (Verbeek, 2002; Roodman, 2006; Doornik and Hendry, 2009 where POLITICAL it is a set of variables illustrating the traits of political connections for firm i in period t; CONTROL it-1 is a set of firm-specific variables describing other political determinants of the dependent variable; and, finally, TIME t x INDUSTRY k is a set of dummy variables designed to render the specific situations in industry k during period t. Table 5 provides the definitions of the explanatory variables. It also contains information on the time lags that are used in the static panel models and on the methodological choices in the dynamic models (the treatment of variables as exogenous or sequentially exogenous and the number of instruments). The expected directions of influence for the group of POLITICAL variables are discussed later when we present the empirical findings.
Therefore, we here concentrate on the control variables. As suggested by the literature, larger firms (LnA) with considerable fixed assets (COLLAT) reporting good profitability ratios (ROS_M) should have higher shares of long-term debt in liabilities. The need for longterm bank financing should also be diminished when asset turnover increases (TAT) and be enhanced when a firm undertakes investment programs (INVEST). Theoretically, the impact of the equity ratio (EQ) on the dependent variable is more ambiguous. On the one hand, a solid capital base means lower risk for lenders; on the other hand, however, significant equity reduces the need for long-term bank loans.
Panel A of A product of (−1) and a difference between a given year and a year in which all current managers and supervisory board members with political ties left their political offices C E PCON_MNG A binary variable identifying companies in which in a given year, a manager had current or past political ties C SE PCON_SUP A binary variable identifying companies in which in a given year a supervisory board member had current or past political ties C SE PCON_GOV A binary variable identifying companies in which in a given year a manager or supervisory board member had current or past political ties as a member of the central government C SE PCON_LOCAL A binary variable identifying companies in which in a given year a manager or supervisory board member had current or past political ties as a member of a local government C SE PCON_PARL A binary variable identifying companies in which in a given year a manager or supervisory board member had current or past political ties as a member of the national parliament C SE PCON_IND An index of the strength of political connections, i.e., an integer ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 assigned to companies with no political connections in a given year (PCON equals zero) and 1, 2, 3, or 4 assigned to companies with simultaneous connections through 1, 2, 3, or 4 channels, respectively, where the connection channels are national parliament, central government, local governments, regulatory, and supervisory authorities of the financial system C SE 
The empirical results
The results testing H1 are presented in Table 7 . The estimated models have good econometric properties. In both static and dynamic models, the independent variables (excluding TIMExINDUSTRY dummies) are jointly significant at the 1% level. The majority of the explanatory variables are also individually significant. With respect to the dynamic models, in all specifications, there is no basis to reject the null hypothesis in the Sargan test regarding the validity of the instruments. The critical assumption of no serial correlation in the disturbances is validated because we find significant negative first-order serial correlations in the differenced residuals (the AR(1) test) and no evidence of second-order serial correlations in the differenced residuals (the AR(2) test).
The firm-specific control variables generally influence the structure of liabilities in the expected directions. Large companies (LnA) that are able to offer valuable collateral (COLLAT) when contracting debt report higher shares of the long-term liabilities in total liabilities. As forecasted, quick asset turnover has a negative effect on the dependent variable, while good operational performance (ROS_M) facilitates access to the long-term bank loans. The results concerning capital base (EQ) and investment programs (INVEST) are more ambiguous. In the static econometric setting (Panel A of Table 7 ), the aforementioned variables are significant and have coefficients with the predicted signs. However, in the GMM estimations, these variables lack statistical significance. The statistical significance of the variables identifying politically connected firms (PCON) and recent political connections (PCON_ACT) is conditional upon the construction of the models. When we apply the random effects estimator, PCON is statistically significant in three of four models and enters the regressions with a coefficient with the expected (positive) sign, suggesting that companies employing persons with political experience have greater access to bank loans in Poland. However, the GMM estimates do not support such a conclusion. PCON in specifications (21) through (24) is not statistically significant. The evidence that recent political ties augment the share of long-term liabilities in total liabilities is slightly stronger, because PCON_ACT is always statistically significant in the static panel models and is significant in dynamic model no. (22). Moreover, it is worth noting that in four of six models in Table 7 , when there are grounds to reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients obtained for PCON and PCON_ACT are equal to zero, these statistical decisions are made only at the 10% level. In sum, in contrast to the majority of studies reviewed in subsection 3.1, we find only weak support for the hypothesis that political connections improve firms' ability to obtain bank loans (H1). and strength of political connections should be dependent on the position held by a connected person within a firm, the type of political experience that a given person possesses, the number of a firm's simultaneous political ties, and the share of politically connected members on a firm's supervisory board or management board in the total number of members of these bodies.
The first division of political connections that we introduce pertains to the role of a connected person within a company. Using our database, we are able to identify political connections through supervisory boards (PCON_SUP) and management boards (PCON_MNG). It seems plausible that because of their prospects on the labour market, politically connected managers should be more interested in using their networks to secure long-term credit contracts than politically connected supervisory board members. This proposition is tested in (29) and (30) indicate that recent political connections are especially valuable in this respect.
The second classification that we use to measure their strength of political connections relates to the type of political experience possessed by connected employees. We define three new binary variables that identify persons with experience in the central government (PCON_GOV), national parliament (PCON_PARL), and local authorities (PCON_LOCAL). We posit that connections at the governmental level should be the most valuable with respect to bank financing. We test this proposition in Table 9 .
The evidence concerning political connections on the governmental level are mixed. In dynamic specification (40), the variable DPCON_GOV, as expected, positively and significantly influences the dependent variable. However, in static model (34) we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated parameter is equal to zero. The tested proposition is indirectly supported by the estimation outcomes for the models incorporating the variable PCON_LOCAL. Three of four such models indicate that political connections on the local level are less valuable with respect to bank financing than other types of political ties. Moreover, the empirical evidence presented in Table 9 confirms that recent political connections significantly improve a firm's ability to obtain long-term bank loans, as PCON_ACT always has positive coefficient and is statistically significant in nine of 12 models. In sum, specifications (33) through (44) provide some support for H2.
To illustrate the strength of political connections, we construct, as in Liu et al.'s (2012) work, an index (the variable PCON_IND) which takes a higher value when a firm possesses political connections on multiple levels. For example, for a company with political ties at the governmental and local levels, PCON_IND takes a value of two. Table 10 presents the estimation results for the models that include the index of the strength of political connections. Unexpectedly, PCON_IND is insignificant in static panel specifications do not confirm the claims that institutional changes were successful in curbing the influence of political connections. This conclusion corresponds with recent findings that political connections are important drivers of firm performance even in a low corruption environment (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013) . In contrast, our calculations provide some support for H4, as all the static panel model specifications in Table 11 suggest that politically connected companies have enjoyed especially privileged access to long-term bank financing during the recent crisis. However, in the dynamic models, PCON_CR is not significant. might quickly lose value after their creation. Therefore, our study suggests that political instability might foster an even playing field with respect to access to bank loans.
Altogether, our results moderately support predictions based on resource dependence theory concerning the role of political connections in the economy. The study also corroborates previous findings that political connections constitute a form of insurance against negative external shocks Blau et al., 2011) , as we document that the significance of political connections is to some degree conditional on the macroeconomic situation in Poland. Finally, the high frequency of politically connected companies among strategically important firms suggests that political connections may be treated as an alternative means of controlling strategically important industries, rather than control through state ownership (Boubakri et al., 2008) . We believe that the conditional, insurancelike value of political connections and the price to pay for this insurance deserve further investigation using detailed data from other markets.
